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Should central banks, because of the zero-lower-bound problem, raise their inflation-rate targets? 
Several arguments are relevant.  (1) In the absence of the ZLB, the optimal steady-state inflation rate,
according to standard New Keynesian reasoning, lies between the Friedman-rule value of deflation
at the steady-state real interest rate and the Calvo-model value of zero, with calibration indicating
a larger weight on the latter.  (2) An attractive modification of the Calvo pricing equation would, however,
imply that the weight on the second of these values should be zero.  (3) There may be some scope
for activist monetary policy to be effective even when the one-period interest rate is at the ZLB; but
there is professional disagreement on this matter.  (4) Present institutional arrangements are not immutable.
In particular, elimination of traditional currency is feasible (even arguably attractive) and would remove
the ZLB constraint on policy.  (5) Increasing target inflation for the purpose of avoiding occasional
ZLB difficulties would tend to undermine the rationale for central bank independence and would constitute
an additional movement away from policy recognition of the economic necessity for intertemporal
discipline.
Bennett T. McCallum






  The purpose of this paper is to consider the merits and demerits of the recently 
renewed suggestion that central banks should, because of the difficulty of providing 
additional monetary stimulus when the policy interest rate is at its zero lower bound, raise 
their inflation-rate targets—for example, from 2 percent per annum to 4 percent.  As is 
well known, this suggestion has been put forth by several economists over the years
1  but 
has recently attracted special prominence as the result of a working paper co-authored by 
Olivier Blanchard, who is not only a leading macroeconomist but is also currently serving 
as director of research of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The paper by   
Blanchard and coauthors (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010) does not explicitly 
promote this suggestion but discusses it in a distinctly sympathetic manner. 
  In considering the issue one apparently needs to compare the magnitude of the 
benefits from occasionally being able to provide additional monetary stimulus against the 
costs of maintaining inflation at a higher value (on average) than would be chosen in the 
absence of the zero lower bound (ZLB).  An extensive and sophisticated analysis relating 
precisely to this topic has recently been provided by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010), a 
paper which will be drawn upon heavily in what follows.  Our discussion begins in 
Section 2 with the usual starting point for such matters, the analysis underlying Milton 
Friedman’s “optimal quantity of money” result, often termed “the Friedman Rule.”
2  Next 
                                                 
1 Frequently-cited examples are Summers (1991) and Fischer (1996).  Also see Yellen (2009) and Williams 
(2009). 
2 It has been my preference to refer to this result as the “Chicago Rule” because (i) there is a different 
“Friedman Rule,” which stipulates that the “total stock of money ... rises month by month, and indeed, so 
far as possible, day by day, at an annual rate of X percent, where X is some number between 3 and 5” 
(Friedman, 1962, p. 54) and (ii) the criterion of satiating the holders of money with the transaction-
facilitating services of money balances had been put forth Tolley (1957), who proposed interest on 
reserves—not deflation to drive the interest rate to zero—as the operative mechanism.  In any event,   2
in Section 3 attention is turned to the type of distortion emphasized more prominently in 
the mainstream New Keynesian literature of recent years, namely, resource 
misallocations brought about by the existence of nominal price stickiness that, in each 
period, affects some sellers but not others.  Section 4 reports on the Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2010) analysis of one key question, namely, whether a steady inflation rate greater 
than 2 percent would be optimal, as indicated by recent formal analysis, when account is 
taken of the ZLB.  Section 5 is concerned with suggestions to the effect that when the 
ZLB is a constraint on the usual one-period policy interest rate, other variables such as 
exchange rates or longer-term interest rates could be effectively used as the instrument 
variable.  Then in Section 6 our focus shifts to a line of argument that contends that the 
ZLB is not in fact a necessary bound, i.e., that with modified institutions it would not be 
impossible for central banks to provide monetary stimulus even when the basic one-
period interbank rate is zero.  Finally, in Section 7 we take up matters not considered to 
that point, ones having to do with the essential role of central banks and other related 
political-economy issues.  Section 8 concludes briefly. 
2. Traditional Theory: Taxation Distortions 
  Most monetary economists are familiar with the basic idea of the Friedman-rule 
analysis:  valuable transaction-facilitating services are provided in larger amounts by 
larger holdings of real money balances, which will be chosen by agents when the interest-
opportunity cost of holding money is lower.  This cost can be varied by varying the 
ongoing inflation rate, which can be adjusted by varying the rate of nominal money 
creation.  Accordingly, since different rates of (paper) money creation do not require 
                                                                                                                                                 
Friedman’s first clear statement of the optimal-inflation-rate rule appears in Friedman (1960, p. 70), not 
Friedman (1969).      3
different rates of usage of tangible resources, the rate should be chosen that leads agents 
to satiate themselves with the transaction-facilitating services provided by holdings of 
money balances.
3  Furthermore, this rate prevails when the opportunity cost is zero, i.e., 
when 1 times the inflation rate (the real rate of return on money holdings) is equated 
with the real rate of return on other assets, i.e., when the nominal interest rate equals zero. 
  This result is developed more formally, and under several assumptions, by 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010).
4  Their analysis develops some points that involve 
variants of the basic reasoning and are perhaps unfamiliar to some readers.  One of these 
concerns the absence of non-distortionary taxes.  Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe emphasize 
that the basic Friedman result requires that the fiscal authority must use taxation to 
continually reduce the money supply by enough to bring about the deflation rate that 
yields a zero nominal interest rate.  Thus the basic reasoning presumes that the fiscal 
authority has available to it some form of lump-sum taxation. 
      Alternatively, suppose that some government consumption is essential to 
optimality and that only non-lump-sum taxes on income (of various types) are available.   
Then it is often argued that that an inflation tax (i.e., an inflation rate above the Friedman 
-rule magnitude) is necessary since optimality requires that the distortionary cost per unit 
of revenue raised must be the same at the margin for all utilized sources of taxation.  
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe dispute this conclusion, associated with Phelps (1973), on the 
basis of a finding that under certain specified conditions the optimal inflation rate 
                                                 
3 This argument does not, of course, require a model specification that implies monetary superneutrality. 
4 Their initial and simplest statement is as follows: “In monetary models in which the only nominal friction 
takes the form of a demand for fiat money for transaction purposes, optimal monetary policy calls for 
minimizing the opportunity cost of holding money by setting the nominal interest rate to zero.  This policy, 
also known as the Friedman Rule, implies an optimal rate of inflation that is negative and equal in absolute 
value to the real rate of interest.” (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010, p.1).   4
continues to equal the Friedman-rule magnitude even when some distorting taxes must be 
used to finance government consumption:  They argue that “in contrast to Phelps’s 
conjecture, negative inflation emerges as optimal even in an environment in which the 
only source of revenue available to the government, other than seignorage revenue, is 
distortionary income taxation.  Remarkably, the optimality of the Friedman rule obtains 
independently of the financial needs of the government ...” (2010, p. 15).  This interesting 
result apparently requires, however, the following assumptions: (i) exactly constant 
returns to scale in production, (ii) factors paid their marginal products, (iii) all factor 
incomes taxed at the same rate, and (iv) zero transaction costs for government 
consumption.  The first three are interesting baseline assumptions, but (iv) seems 
unattractive: are the resources used by government in shopping not valuable?        
  Before moving on, it is germane to point out some unorthodox opinions 
concerning the Friedman line of analysis that are expressed in the frequently-cited piece 
by Summers (1991), mentioned above.  Summers states: “I think the view that inflation is 
costly is correct, but it has nothing to do with optimal tax theory.... A valid case for low 
inflation must have to do with the inefficiencies caused by allowing the monetary 
standard to vary and by the instability that results when the inflation trend is changed.  
Standard optimal tax issues along Ramsey lines are nth-order considerations.  Inflation as 
a Ramsey tax may be the most overstudied issue in macroeconomics.” (1991, pp. 626, 
627).  That I have some sympathy with one aspect of Summers’s position may become 
apparent below.      
3. Mainstream New Keynesian Theory: Calvo-Model Distortions 
  In recent years, due in large part to the huge influence of Woodford’s (2003) opus,   5
less attention has been devoted to “nominal frictions” of the type discussed in the 
previous section, i.e., those having to do with the medium-of-exchange role of money.
5  
Instead, the frictions focused upon pertain to posited stickiness of nominal prices of 
goods and, in some cases, labor.  While other models of gradual price adjustment have 
been put forth,
6 the clear leader in this regard is the basic discrete-time version of Calvo 
(1983).  As is well known, the stylized friction is that in each period only a fraction 1 
of the economy’s sellers, randomly selected, have the opportunity to change their prices, 
the others continuing with the same prices as in the previous period.  In any period, 
accordingly, there are sellers (of goods that have the same production cost functions) 
charging different prices in a setting of monopolistic competition.   These features imply 
a misallocation of productive resources among the various sellers, which is the social cost 
of the nominal friction implied by the Calvo price specification.  Only if monetary policy 
generates an average inflation rate that makes the average price of currently-reoptimizing 
sellers equal those of the other sellers (who are stuck with their previous prices) will this 
distortion be eliminated.  Consequently, the optimal inflation rate in this environment 
(with no other nominal friction) equals zero.
7 
  To consider the compromise between the Friedman-rule and Calvo-model optimal 
inflation rates, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe adopt a specification that includes both types of 
friction and obtain results under various different calibration assumptions.  By and large, 
their results suggest that the tradeoff is such that the optimal rate is close to zero, i.e., that 
                                                 
5 Actually, there is an important sense in which these are “real,” not nominal, frictions.  That is, typical 
 specifications posit that real transaction costs (either shopping time or real resource usage) are reduced 
when purchasers keep on hand additional quantities of money in real—not nominal—terms.   
6 The “sticky information” formulation of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2009) has attained a fairly 
substantial following; my own favorite is discussed in McCallum (2008). 
7 For fleshed-out discussions see Woodford (2003, pp. 392-419) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010, pp. 
38-42).   6
the importance of the price-setting friction is quantitatively greater, to a considerable 
extent, than the medium-of-exchange aspect featured in the Friedman-rule analysis.  
Their summary statement is “We conclude that for plausible calibrations the price-
stickiness friction dominates the optimal choice of long-run inflation” (Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe 2010, p. 51). 
  In this regard, I would like to suggest that there is one feature of the standard 
Calvo model that is crucial for this finding and which should be considered as 
questionable at best.  In particular, I would argue that the basic version of the Calvo 
model is flawed, as a model of optimal price setting with the assumed type of friction, via 
its assumption that those sellers, who do not have an opportunity to reoptimize in a given 
period, leave their prices at the value charged in the previous period.  This might make 
sense in a world in which the steady-state inflation rate is zero, but if that rate was (say) 
X percent per period, it would seem that a rational pricing policy would call for each 
seller who cannot reoptimize to have his selling price automatically rise from its previous 
level by an amount that implies an X percent increase.
8  For an example of one 
formulation of this type, but extended to non-steady-state conditions, see the pricing 
behavior assumed in Woodford (2008, pp. 1566-8).
9  Under such a formulation, the 
average dispersion of prices will be unaffected by the steady-state inflation rate, so the 
social optimum depends only on Friedman-rule considerations. To demonstrate this, 
suppose that the price adjustment relationship is written, as in Woodford (2008), as 
                                                 
8 These automatic price adjustments would have been arranged earlier, on the basis of existing information 
concerning the prevailing steady-state inflation rate. 
9 It is well-known that Yun (1996), in an important early paper, utilized a price adjustment model that is 
somewhat similar to the basic Calvo model but in terms of deviations of inflation from steady-state values.  
More recently, specifications embodying the same basic idea as (1), i.e., that automatic price adjustments 
for sellers unable to reoptimize should be part of an optimizing price strategy in the face of price stickiness, 
have been extensively developed by Calvo, Celesun, and Kumhoff (2001) and Freedman, Kumhof, and 
Laxton (2010), among others.   7
(1)   tt t t 1t 1 t p( E p ) ( m c )            
where  t p   is inflation in period t,  t   is the period-t expected value of the ongoing 
inflation rate in the economy under consideration with the monetary policy rule under 
consideration,
10 and mct is the fractional deviation of marginal production cost in t from 
its steady state value.  Also 0 <  < 1, and  > 0.  That the cost of inflation in the usual 
version of the Calvo model, in which the  t   and  t1    terms do not appear, is proportional 
to the unconditional expectation Et = Et+1 can be seen as follows.  From a steady-state 
perspective we have 
(2)  pp ( m c )         
so mc = [(1)/]p, which departs from zero in proportion to the ongoing inflation rate.  
Thus in that setup the costs are minimized if p = 0.  In the modified model (1), however, 
we have—since Ept = Ept+1 = Ep and Et = Et+1—the steady state relation is 
(3)  t (1 )(0) (1 )(0) E(mc )     , 
which implies that the average dispersion cost equals zero for whatever steady-state rate 
prevails.  With this specification, then, the steady-state cost of inflation depends (in the 
absence of the ZLB) only upon the Friedman-rule “shoe-leather” cost occasioned by non-
satiation with the services of the medium of exchange. 
4. Optimality in the Presence of the Zero Lower Bound 
  At this point we turn to the ZLB issue more directly.  One significant 
accomplishment of the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) paper is to consider, by means of 
                                                 
10 Woodford (2008, p. 1568) notes that  t   can be operationally viewed as the Beveridge-Nelson (1981) 
value of the “stochastic trend rate of inflation,” i.e., a stochastic growth rate for the price level, which is 
well defined so long as the inflation rate is difference-stationary with an unconditional mean of zero for its 
first difference, which is here assumed.  This value is ultimately given by the central bank’s inflation target.   8
simulations of a rich calibrated model under various assumptions, quantitative aspects of 
the optimal rate of inflation in economies with more than one nominal friction.  Indeed, 
one section of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) is entitled “Does the Zero Bound Provide 
a Rationale for Positive Inflation Targets?”  A quotation from the paper may be useful in 
judging the nature of their study:   
  We believe ... this argument is best evaluated in the context of an empirically 
  realistic quantitative model of the business cycle.  In Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
  (2007b) we study Ramsey optimal monetary policy in an estimated medium-scale 
  model of the macroeconomy.  The theoretical framework employed there 
  emphasizes the importance of combining nominal as well as real rigidities in 
  explaining the propagation of macroeconomic shocks.  Specifically, the model 
  features four nominal frictions, sticky prices, sticky wages, a transactional demand
  for money by households, and a cash-in-advance constraint on the wage bill of 
  firms, and four sources of real rigidities, investment   adjustment costs, variable 
  capacity utilization, habit formation, and imperfect competition in product and 
  factor markets.  Aggregate fluctuations are driven by three shocks: a permanent 
  neutral labor-augmenting technology shock, a permanent investment-specific 
  technology shock, and temporary variations in government spending (2010, p. 52). 
    
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe explain how parameter values used in these exercises are 
obtained and offer plausible justification.  The basic finding is that “the Ramsey optimal 
policy implies a mean inflation rate of  0.4 percent per year.... Under the Ramsey 
optimal monetary policy, the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate is only 0.9 
percentage points at an annual rate ... [while] the Ramsey optimal level of the nominal 
interest rate is 4.4 percent... [implying that] for the nominal interest rate to violate the 
zero bound, it must fall more than 4 standard deviations below its target level” (2010, p. 
53).  In this regard, the quoted results are for an assumed time-preference rate of 0.03 per   9
year, smaller than that implied by the 0.99 quarterly discount factor that is typically used 
in monetary policy studies.  Moreover, “lowering the subjective discount factor ... to 1 
percent per year results in a Ramsey-optimal nominal interest rate process that ... [implies 
that] ... the nominal interest rate must still fall by almost three standard deviations below 
its mean for the zero bound to be violated” (2010, p. 53).   
  The point is, then, that the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe analysis suggests that the 
ZLB constraint will be binding so rarely that these authors are led “to conjecture that in 
an augmented version of the model that explicitly imposes the zero bound constraint, the 
optimal inflation target would be similar to the 0.4 percent per year that is optimal” in 
their model.  In support of that view, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe comment on results of 
Adam and Billi (2006), as follows: “These authors compute the optimal monetary policy 
in a simpler version of the new Keynesian model.... An advantage of their approach is 
that they take explicitly into account the zero bound restriction in computing the optimal 
policy regime.  They find that the optimal monetary policy does not imply positive 
inflation on average and that the zero bound binds infrequently.... We conjecture ... that 
should a money demand be added to their framework, the average optimal rate of 
inflation would indeed be negative” (2010, p. 54).
11   
  Results of the type cited in this section are optimistic in that they do not offer 
much—if any—support to the idea that raising the inflation-target objective (and with it 
the average inflation rate) would be desirable.  Unfortunately, however, they are 
inherently open to challenge and/or reinterpretation.   
                                                 
11 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010, p. 54) also cite results of Reifschneider and Williams (2000) that are 
compatible.  Recently, Williams (2009) has, by contrast, discussed considerations that are more favorable 
with respect to the proposal of a raised inflation target.  Even more recently, Billi (2010) has demonstrated 
that an inability of the central bank to commit can raise the optimal inflation rate considerably.    10
 
  A significant problem, for example, is the absence from the Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe analysis of the distinction between one-period interbank rates of interest and one-
period rates of the “risk-free” or “purely intertemporal” variety that is relevant for 
intertemporal decisions.  That is, in analysis that recognizes a banking sector that uses 
resources to make loans that finance its money issues—the central bank supplying this 
sector with base money—the discrepancy between these interbank and risk-free rates can 
be quite large.  In the calibration of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), for example, the 
difference between the (real) rates is 6.0  0.84 = 5.16 percent per annum (2007, p. 
1492).
12  Since it is the lower interbank rate that is relevant for the ZLB problem whereas 
the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe analysis implicitly refers to the risk-free rate, recognition of 
this distinction could completely overturn the optimistic presumption that the analysis 
described above suggests that the ZLB would be binding only rarely.
13 
5. Alternative Monetary Strategies 
  Before moving on to more drastic proposals, mention should be made of some 
proposed strategies for monetary policy management in the face of the ZLB constraint, 
taking it for granted that such a constraint exists.  Here the prevailing view seems to be 
that of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), who show that the output loss from a temporary 
ZLB constraint can be lessened by use of a “history dependent” rule for the one-period 
policy interest rate, designed in a manner that has the effect of implying that policy will 
                                                 
12 Here the 6.0 figure comes from assumed values of a 4 % p.a. time preference rate and a 2% p.a. growth 
rate of population.  The 0.84% p.a. figure is close to the 1% that Campbell (1999, p. 1241) reports for the 
real three-month T-bill rate for the United States over 1947.2-1996.4.  (Somewhat confusingly, Campbell 
refers to this as the “risk-free” rate since he is also assuming the absence of costly banking.)  
13 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) provide interesting analyses of several topics not mentioned in the 
present paper, including the effects of foreign demand for domestic currency and of incorrectly estimated 
inflation rates.   11
be kept more stimulative in the future than would otherwise (i.e., without the temporary 
ZLB constraint) be the case.   
  Alternatively, it has been argued by Svensson (2001) and McCallum (2000) that 
monetary demand management can be conducted effectively under ZLB conditions by 
appropriate exchange-rate policies.  The idea is that one-period risk-free bonds and 
foreign exchange are not perfect substitutes, presumably for reasons stressed in the 
“portfolio balance” literature of the 1970s.
14  Central bank purchases of foreign exchange 
will, accordingly, tend to depreciate the country’s exchange rate.  The central bank could 
then exploit that relationship to manage the (nominal) exchange rate in accordance with a 
policy rule expressed in terms of an exchange rate instrument—with the rate of exchange 
rate appreciation appearing in place of the policy interest rate in a Taylor-style rule.
15  Of 
course, real exchange rate depreciation appears in the “expectational IS” portion of a 
typical New Keynesian open-economy model, so with sticky prices this mode of policy 
behavior can have systematic effects on real aggregate demand in the economy under 
discussion, even with the one-period interest rate immobilized at zero.  Simulations 
reported in McCallum (2000, 2003), for example, indicate that substantial stabilization 
can be effected in this manner.
16  Also, if the economy in question is small in relation to 
the world, the policy will not have “beggar-thy-neighbor” effects. 
  An argument against this position might seem to be implied by Woodford’s 
(2005) comment on the suggestion by McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams (2005) of 
“Using a Long-Term Interest Rate as the Monetary Policy Instrument.”  Specifically, 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Dornbusch (1980). 
15 To apply this rule the central bank would not need to know the specification of the portfolio balance 
relation between foreign exchange purchases and the rate of depreciation, just as Taylor-rule central banks 
do not need to know money demand functions to be able to implement interest-rate policy rules.  
16 For alternative results in much the same spirit, see Coenen and Wieland (2003).   12
Woodford criticizes the long-rate strategy and mentions that “similar comments apply to 
the proposal by Svensson (2003) that the exchange rate be used as the instrument of 
policy when an economy is in a ‘liquidity trap.’”
17  The problem is that rules based on 
multi-period interest rates (or on exchange rates) cannot expand the set of possibilities 
without driving the one-period rate into the negative (and therefore infeasible) range.  
That argument is, however, based on an assumed term-structure model in which the 
longer-term interest rates are related to one-period rates by a relationship that depends 
only upon expected yields, with no included “portfolio” terms involving quantities, such 
as those mentioned above.  This same statement applies, moreover, to the uncovered 
interest parity relationship involving exchange rates.  Thus, Woodford’s argument 
apparently does not refute the one made above, which does presume the presence of 
portfolio-balance departures from the counterpart of the expectations theory as applied to 
exchange rates, i.e., uncovered interest parity.
18  In addition, the argument made here 
would apply also to use of long term domestic interest rates if the term-structure 
relationship involves relative quantities of different-maturity bonds.  Emphasis on the 
exchange-rate case would seem to imply a belief that foreign one-period bonds are more 
imperfect substitutes for domestic one-period bonds than are domestic long-term bonds.   
6. Is the ZLB Actually a Genuine Bound? 
 But  is it actually the case that zero represents a lower bound on nominal interest 
rates?  Of course the precise lower bound may be slightly negative because of the cost of 
storing money, as mentioned by McCallum (2000, p. 875) and others, but this magnitude 
                                                 
17 Presumably, the same objection would apply to the closely related proposal in McCallum (2000). 
18 My argument is, nevertheless, open to the objection that quantitative magnitudes have not been explored; 
my simulations simply assume that the exchange rate depreciations called for by the policy rule can be 
implemented.   13
is small enough to be neglected.  That is not the matter here under discussion.  Instead, 
our concern now is the validity of the argument, developed by Goodfriend (2000, 2001) 
and Buiter (2003, 2010), that with modern technology institutions can be designed so as 
to permit payment of negative nominal interest on all forms of money, thereby making it 
possible to have negative (as well as positive) rates for the central bank’s policy rate, and 
thereby eliminating—rather than surmounting—the putative problem of the ZLB.  In this 
regard, Citi Research (2010, p.5), presumably influenced strongly by Buiter (2010), states 
that “there are at least three administratively and technically feasible ways to eliminate 
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates completely... The first is to abolish 
currency.  The second is to ... start paying interest, positive or negative, on currency.  The 
third is to ... end the fixed exchange rate ... between currency and bank reserves or 
deposits with the central bank.” 
  The abolishment of currency seems like an extremely radical step—almost 
unimaginable—until one contemplates it somewhat calmly.  My own attitude has been 
influenced by a rather trivial aspect of my own routine—lunch each day at my university.  
Only a few years ago, my regular lunch companions and I used cash to pay for our 
lunches at the Carnegie Mellon Faculty Club, and I was annoyed when someone in line 
ahead of us chose to pay by credit card and thereby slowed the process noticeably.  Then 
a new system for accepting credit-card payments was adopted by the cashier, and the 
time needed for a credit-card transaction decreased sharply.  A couple of years ago, I 
realized that one of my companions had adopted a routine of paying by credit card—and 
that this apparently involved no extra time at all.  Finally, a few months ago, I realized 
that all of my regular companions had switched to credit-card payment as their usual   14
mode of transaction—and that each of them was taking less of the cashier’s time (and 
that of other customers) than I was imposing each day with my cash transaction!  A 
second recognition was that taxi cabs now typically have facilities for accepting credit-
card payments, thereby eliminating an example that I used to mention in undergraduate 
classes as transactions for which one needed to carry cash. 
  More seriously, I have been impressed by the point that approximately 75 percent 
(by value) of U.S. currency outstanding consists of 100-dollar bills.  These are notes of 
the largest denomination, of course—which are of greatest use to “... the underground 
economy, the criminal community, that is, those engaged in tax evasion, money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, and those wishing to store the proceeds from 
crime and the means to commit further crimes out of sight and reach of the authorities” 
(Buiter, 2010, p. 224).  In the case of the Euro, 59 percent of the value of Euro notes 
outstanding in April 2009 were in the denominations of 100, 200, or 500 euros while less 
than 10 percent of the stock value was in the form of 5, 10, and 20 euros (Buiter, 2010, p. 
223).  Partly on the basis of these facts, Buiter develops a strong argument for the 
elimination of (government) currency.  An important part of the argument is the 
suggestion, made in Goodfriend (2000), that the central bank make available free 
transaction accounts to all legal residents, accounts that could be administered through 
“commercial banks, post offices, and other retail facilities” (2000, p. 224).     
  A second approach involves taxation of currency.  Buiter (2010) stresses, 
however, that there are inherent problems with the administration of positive tax rates 
(i.e., negative interest rates) on negotiable bearer instruments that sharply reduce the 
attractiveness of this approach.  Goodfriend (2000, p. 1016) has suggested that “... a carry   15
tax could be imposed on currency by imbedding a magnetic strip in each bill.  The 
magnetic strip could visibly record when a bill was last withdrawn from the banking 
system ... [with a tax] deducted from each bill upon deposit according to how long the 
bill was in circulation since last withdrawn ....”   Perhaps such a system could become 
viable in the future, but with today’s technology it would appear excessively expensive. 
  A third approach of Buiter’s is to unbundle—divorce—the medium of exchange 
(MOE) and the medium of account (MOA).  The MOE consists in part of currency and 
claims to currency; the MOA is the entity in terms of which prices are quoted.  
Governments do not invariably have full control over either of these, but can retain 
control over the MOE if government currency is not issued to excess.  And by requiring 
that transactions with the government must be denominated in terms of an appointed 
MOA it can most likely gain acceptance for its choice of the latter.  Then in each period it 
can specify interest rates for both, with the MOE interest rate kept non-negative but with 
no such stipulation for the MOA rate, by issuing bonds in terms of both media.  Then the 
central bank can conduct policy in terms of its instrument, the MOA interest rate.  If 
prices in terms of this MOA are the prices that are relevant for market supplies and 
demands, then the central bank continues to be able to influence aggregate demand by 
variations in the policy interest rate even when the MOE rate is immobilized at zero. 
  Buiter (2010) devotes many words to analysis of this third approach, but it seems 
that his preference is probably for the abolition of currency.
19  Actually, it should be said, 
it is the abolition of a government-issued currency that Buiter and Goodfriend have in 
mind.  Both evidently would favor regulations that would not rule out the possibility of 
                                                 
19 In this regard, Goodfriend has remarked in conversation that “currency is the most unsanitary object that 
most of us handle on a regular basis.”   16
private issuers attempting to put their own currency-like vehicles into circulation.
20 
  In any event, it would seem entirely appropriate that serious consideration be 
given to the Buiter and Goodfriend proposals, if it transpires that the ZLB constraint is 
more of a problem than the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe analysis suggests.      
7. The Duties of a Central Bank 
  Before the financial crisis of 2008-2009, monetary economists had become rather 
proud of the development of their subject over the preceding 10-15 years. There had been 
great progress in formal analysis and also in the actual conduct of monetary policy.  
Analytically, the profession developed an approach to policy analysis that centers around 
a somewhat standardized dynamic model framework that is designed to be structural—
that is, respectful of both theory and evidence—and therefore usable in principle for 
policy analysis. This framework includes a policy instrument that agrees with the one 
typically used in practice and recognizes that, for imperfectly understood reasons, 
nominal price adjustments do not take place immediately so that monetary policy actions 
will have significant consequences for the behavior of real aggregate variables such as 
output and employment. Indeed, models of this type were being used (in similar ways) by 
economists in both academia and in central banks, where several economic researchers 
had gained leading policymaking positions.  Meanwhile, in terms of practice, most 
central banks had been much more successful than in previous decades in keeping 
inflation low while also avoiding major recessions (with a few exceptions) prior to 2008.  
                                                 
20 Before continuing, it should be noted that there similarities but also (crucial) differences between 
Buiter’s third approach and what I would term the Yeager-Greenfield system.  The latter has been 
developed in a number of papers by Leland Yeager (1983, 1992), plus others that are co-authored with 
Robert Greenfield (Greenfield and Yeager, 1983).  A brief discussion is provided in McCallum (2010).  
One major difference is that the Yeager-Greenfield system was originally designed as one intended to 
eliminate, or reduce as far as possible, governmental influence on monetary affairs.  A second is that a 
major objective of the Yeager-Greenfield system is to achieve “stability,” in the sense of constancy through 
time, of the price level, whereas Buiter’s approach is more concerned with avoidance of recessions.   17
Furthermore, these improvements in science and application had been interrelated: the 
“inflation targeting” style of policy practice that had been adopted by numerous 
important central banks—and that arguably had been practiced unofficially by the 
Federal Reserve—is strongly related in principle to the prevailing framework for 
analysis.
21 Accordingly, one keystone of the “consensus” view was that central bank 
control of the inflation rate is the central ingredient in successful monetary policy 
practice, and that this control called both for inflation “stability,” in the sense of little 
variation from year to year, and for a low average level—often in the range of 1 percent 
to 2 percent per annum. The crisis has, however, damaged—if not destroyed—that 
consensus; the Blanchard, et. al. paper is evidence of that.  
  It would seem, however, that the recent crisis is highly inappropriate as a 
centerpiece for reconsideration of an economy’s monetary policy.  To a considerable 
extent, the crisis was precipitated by events in the United States.  There the primary root 
of the crisis was a genuine macroeconomic imbalance that required correction, namely, 
the housing price boom.  What were its origins?  The situation in housing was largely 
brought about by deliberate government action designed to stimulate homeownership 
even among—actually, especially among—families that were not suited for and could not 
afford homeownership.
22  This sectoral imbalance was then turned into a macroeconomic 
collapse by unwise regulations and practices in financial markets that led to the freezing-
up of the latter.  In that regard numerous practices of private enterprises in the financial 
industry were truly appalling, but again much of the problem can be traced back to an 
unwise governmental framework; one prominent example being regulations that gave 
                                                 
21 For an exposition that discusses this development, by an author who participated both as researcher and 
policymaker, see Goodfriend (2007). 
22  For short discussions, see Pinto (2010) and Wallison (2010).   18
undue importance to the ratings of a few private firms in the credit-rating industry.  The 
point is that none of these failures had much if anything to do with monetary policy.
23  To 
drastically alter the objectives of monetary policy in response to the crisis would seem, 
accordingly, to be lacking in logic.        
  From a more general perspective, some lack of clarity about the monetary policy 
duties of a central bank has resulted from the drastic change in monetary arrangements—
from metallic standards to fiat money arrangements—that occurred during the 20th 
century.  Under a metallic standard, the central bank has basically no price-level duties so 
long as the standard does not break down.  Behavior of the price level is governed 
primarily by the mint, whereas the central bank is just that—an intermediary intended to 
facilitate the financial activities of the government.  Under a fiat-money arrangement, by 
contrast, price level trends are determined by the abundance of money in circulation 
relative to the quantity needed (i.e., useful) for conducting transactions, and modern 
central banks have been universally assigned the duty of price level management.  For 
example, in the Journal of Economic Literature’s recent “panel discussion” of Federal 
Reserve duties by Blinder (2010) and Feldstein (2010), both contributors take it for 
granted that central banks will be the makers of monetary policy and argue that they 
should have extensive independence in that role.
24      
  In my opinion, a major justification for central-bank independence is that 
generally—except in ZLB situations—the desirable effects of monetary policy loosening 
                                                 
23 John Taylor (2009) has argued that monetary policy was unduly expansionary during the period 2003-
2005 and that this mistake was an important cause of the crisis.  I would agree that policy was inappropriate 
in that manner, but consider this policy mistake as less egregious than the other items mentioned in the 
present paragraph.  In any event, Taylor’s argument would certainly appear to provide no support for an 
increase in the target inflation rate! 
24 Consequently, the panel discussion referred to is mostly concerned with the regulatory responsibilities of 
a central bank.  For an ambitious recent proposal for Federal Reserve strategy, see Goodfriend (2010).   19
occur rapidly and the undesirable effects materialize only after a greater lag.  When the 
CB eases policy—i.e., making monetary conditions more stimulative and aggregate 
demand stronger—the socially desirable effects arrive more promptly than do the 
undesirable effects.  That is, there will normally be effects that can be thought of as 
expansions of output and employment (relative to what would have prevailed in the 
absence of the policy change) that will begin to occur within two or three months.  Then 
after one or two years there will also occur upward pressures on the inflation rate.  If 
instead the policy action is one that tightens policy, rather than loosening it, there will be 
relatively prompt reductions of output and employment, followed in a year or so by 
reductions in the inflation rate.  Now, it is the case that most economists, congressmen, 
commentators, and citizens consider expansions in the level of employment and output to 
be desirable and increases in the inflation rate to be undesirable.  Accordingly, if 
monetary policy is required to be politically acceptable, there is a tendency for policy to 
be more expansionary and inflationary the more impatient is the policymaker—the 
shorter is his effective time horizon.  One way to avoid policies that give primary 
emphasis to short-run considerations is to place responsibility for monetary policy in an 
institution that is somewhat sheltered from the stresses of day-to-day politics, and 
consequently able to take a longer-term perspective. 
  An extremely important ingredient in such a perspective is the understanding that 
there exists no usable long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (or output) 
—i.e., that some version of the “natural rate hypothesis” is valid.  Moreover, a major 
contribution of the “consensus” position of mainstream monetary economics that evolved 
in the 10-15 years prior to 2008 was the development of models that incorporated this   20
natural-rate feature
25 while also reflecting the property that monetary policy has 
substantial short-term effects on the behavior of output and employment. 
  But to adopt the position that the average ongoing inflation rate should be raised 
(as it certainly would be if the target were raised), in order to prevent or shorten 
recessions involving the ZLB, is to accept the notion that there does exist a long-run 
tradeoff.  It is based on a different mechanism than the Phillips Curve tradeoff, but in 
public debate and actual policy consideration this distinction would be lost.  Thus it 
would serve to overturn a basic message that the profession has been at great pains to 
present to policy makers.  Admittedly, this is an argument based on considerations of 
“communication,” not science, but nevertheless should arguably be taken into 
consideration.       
  To some readers a move to a 4.0 percent inflation rate may seem entirely 
innocuous.  To emphasize the contrary possibility, let us ask the following question: 
What would be the United States price level now, in 2010, if a steady 4 percent inflation 
rate had prevailed since 1792, the year in which a United States monetary standard was 
first established?
26  Since 2010  1792 = 218, the price level today would be 1.04
218 = 
5167.3 times the price level of 1792 if inflation had been 4 percent each year.  In fact, the 
actual CPI price level today is only 23.54 times as high as in 1792.
27  Consequently, if a 4 
percent inflation rate had prevailed since 1792, prices today would be 219.5 times as high 
                                                 
25 Actually, with the basic Calvo model of price adjustment, these models do not quite have the strict 
natural-rate property.  The modification promoted in Section 6 does, however, satisfy a non-strict version 
as discussed by Andrés, López-Salido, and Nelson (2005).  
26 Under the Articles of Confederation, the states did not share a national monetary standard.  
Implementation of the Constitutional provisions regarding money began with the Coinage Act of 1792. 
27 The CPI index, on the basis of a 100 value for 1982-84, is reported by Measuring Worth (2010) to have 
equaled 9.72 in 1792, whereas the June 2010 value reported by the St. Louis Fed’s FRED is 218.2.   21
as they actually are, on average.
28  
  Finally, I would suggest that in the United States, and also in many other 
countries, central banks have shown themselves in recent years to be the primary—
indeed, only visible—source of intertemporal discipline in fiscal affairs.  The point is that 
the overall government budget constraint implies that if the central bank maintains a low 
growth rate of the monetary base, it limits the extent to which the fiscal authority can 
engage in deficit finance.
29  If the treasury seeks to exceed this limit by means of 
(excessive) borrowing (selling bonds) it will run into a constraint reflecting the implied 
violation of a transversality condition relevant for optimal behavior for private lenders.  
In this context, a switch to a higher target inflation rate evidently represent one more 
move away from intertemporal discipline, a position that that many economists would 
want to avoid.    
8. Conclusion 
  A summary of the paper’s arguments can be presented briefly, as follows.  First, 
in the absence of the ZLB, the optimal steady state inflation rate, according to standard 
New Keynesian reasoning, lies somewhere between the Friedman-rule value of deflation 
at the steady-state real rate of interest and the Calvo-model value of zero, with careful      
                                                 
28 I would have to admit that in terms of economic analysis, this last fact alone is rather devoid of 
significance.  At the same time, I schizophrenically believe that many citizens, even well educated ones, are 
frequently confused in thinking about issues relating to inflation.  (My own mother, who was the author of 
a well-respected work in U.S. history that was kept in print for two or three decades by a reputable 
university press, would occasionally express doubts that the inflation rate had recently fallen by stating that 
“I know that [specific item] costs more now than it did at the same store a year ago.”)  That being the case, 
it would seem that a desirable monetary system would have the property of being easy for an average 
citizen to understand and cope with.  Under current conditions, a substantial fraction of measured GDP 
consists of the activities of persons seeking to profit from other individuals’ lack of understanding of the 
causes and effects of inflation.  A general if somewhat elusive discussion that emphasizes the medium of 
account role of money is provided by Niehans (1978, pp. ). 
29 This contention presumes that the central bank is in fact given control of the monetary base, even when 
its desires conflict with those of the ministry of finance.  It is my impression that this is the appropriate 
assumption for the United States and most other developed economies.   22
calibration indicating that the weight on the latter may be considerably larger.  Second, 
however, an attractive modification of the Calvo model would imply that the weight on 
the latter of these values should be zero, so that the Friedman-rule prescription would be 
optimal (in the absence of the ZLB).  Third, even when the effects of the ZLB are added 
to the analysis, the optimal inflation rate is (according to this line of reasoning) probably 
negative.  Fourth, there is perhaps some scope for activist monetary policy to be effective 
(via, e.g., an exchange-rate channel) even when the one-period nominal interest rate is at 
the ZLB; but there is professional disagreement on this matter.  Fifth, while the ZLB is a 
genuine constraint under present institutional arrangements, these are not immutable.  
Elimination of traditional currency could be effected, in which case there would be no 
zero lower bound on one-period nominal interest rates and therefore no reason involving 
such losses for having an increased target rate of inflation.  Sixth, increasing the target 
inflation rate for the purpose of avoiding occasional ZLB difficulties would constitute a 
reversal of a central message, of recent monetary policy analysis, to the effect that there 
is no long-run benefit in terms of output or employment from the adoption of increased 
inflation rates.  Seventh, such an increase in the target inflation rate would tend to 
undermine the rationale for central bank independence and would constitute an additional 
movement away from intertemporal discipline.       
    23
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